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Abstract—We derive a new upper bound on the string
oblivious transfer capacity of discrete memoryless channels
(DMC). The main tool we use is the tension region of a
pair of random variables introduced in Prabhakaran and
Prabhakaran (2014) where it was used to derive upper
bounds on rates of secure sampling in the source model. In
this paper, we consider secure computation of string oblivious
transfer in the channel model. Our bound is based on a
monotonicity property of the tension region in the channel
model. We show that our bound strictly improves upon the
upper bound of Ahlswede and Csisza´r (2013).
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of secure function computation is for users in
a network to compute functions of their collective data
in such a way that users do not learn any additional
information about the data than the output of the functions
they are computing. This forms a central theme of mod-
ern cryptography under the rubric of Secure Multiparty
Computation.
In general, information theoretically secure function
computation between two users, who are equipped only
with private/common randomness and noiseless commu-
nication channels between them, is infeasible except for
a class of essentially trivial functions [10]. However,
Cre´peau and Kilian showed that any function may be
computed information theoretically securely if a (non-
trivial) noisy channel is available from one of the users to
the other [4]. The approach was to show that a certain
primitive secure computation called oblivious transfer
(OT) [16] is feasible given such a noisy channel resource,
and then rely on a reduction of of two-party computation
to OT by Kilian [9].
OT (more specifically, 1-out-of-2 m-string OT) is the
following secure function computation between two users,
say, Alice and Bob: Alice is given 2 strings S0, S1 picked
independently and identically uniformly distributed from
{0, 1}m, Bob is given a uniform binary bit K, independent
of S0, S1. Alice is required to produce no output and Bob
should output SK . Furthermore, Alice should not learn any
information about K and Bob should not learn anything
about the string SK¯ , where K¯ = K + 1 mod 2. As must
be clear from the discussion above, OT cannot be securely
computed when Alice and Bob only have access to
noise-free communication channels and private/common
randomness.
Motivated by its role in secure computation, several
works have addressed the rate at which OT can be obtained
from a discrete memoryless channel (DMC). In [12], OT
capacity of a DMC was defined as the largest rate of m-
over-n, where n is the number of channel uses, achievable
when Bob recovers SK with vanishing probability of error
and under vanishing information leakage measured via
conditional mutual informations. The paper also charac-
terized noisy resources which provide a strictly positive
OT capacity. The OT capacity of erasure channels was
obtained in [7] for the honest-but-curious setting, where
the users follow the protocol faithfully, but attempt to
derive information they are not allowed to know from
everything they have access to at the end of the protocol.
Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1] characterized the OT capacity
for a more general class of channels called the generalized
erasure channels. In [13], it was shown that the OT
capacity of generalized erasure channels remain the same
even when the users are allowed to be malicious. The best
known upper bounds on the OT capacity of DMCs are due
to Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1]1. These bounds, which apply
for the case of honest-but-curious users (and therefore,
also for malicious users), were obtained by weakening
the problem of obtaining OT from a DMC to a secret key
agreement problem. In this paper we strictly improve upon
these bounds.
The main tool we use is the tension region T(U ;V )
of a pair of random variables U, V introduced in [15].
Defined as the increasing hull of the set of all
(I(V ;Q|U), I(U ;Q|V ), I(U ;V |Q), where Q is some
random variables jointly distributed with U, V , it has
the interpretation as a rate-information tradeoff region
for a distributed common randomness generation problem
which generalizes the setting of Ga´cs and Ko¨rner [5].
Specifically, consider a genie who has access to Un, V n ∼
p(u, v) i.i.d., who needs to communicate to a user with
only Un and separately to a user with only V n such
that two users may agree (with vanishing probability of
error) on a common random variable W . The “quality” is
measured by how small the average “residual information”
I(Un;V n|W )/n is. It was shown in [15] that the trade-off
between the two rates of communication from the genie to
1The same upper bounds can be inferred from an earlier work by Wolf
and Wullschleger [17] for the case of zero-error and perfect privacy.
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the users and the quality of the common random variable
agreed by the users is given by the tension region.
In [15], properties of tension region were used to derive
upper bounds on the rate of a form of secure computation
with no inputs, but randomized outputs, called secure
sampling for the source model, i.e., the “noisy” resource
available to the two users are observations from a dis-
tributed source (rather than a noisy channel as here), and
the goal of the secure computation is to produce samples
of another distributed source in such a way that neither
user can infer any more information about each other’s
output than can be inferred from their own outputs2.
The upper bound technique was a monotonicity result for
secure sampling protocols which implies that the tension
region of the outputs must contain the tension region of
the distributed source samples.
In contrast, this paper deals with the channel model.
The main technical contributions include a version of the
monotonicity result for the channel model. It turns out
that, unlike in the source model, the whole tension region
does not satisfy a useful (i.e., single-letterizable) monon-
tonicty property, but its restriction to the I(V ;Q|U) = 0
plane does. Specifically, we show that the restricted ten-
sion region of the inputs-and-outputs of the function being
securely computed must contain the (Minkowski) sum
of the restricted tension regions of the input and output
of the DMC at each channel use. We turn this into an
upper bound on the OT capacity by characterizing the
restricted tension region of the inputs-and-outputs of the
OT function. In the interest of space, we only present
the argument required to obtain our upper bound on OT
capacity in this paper. The more general monotonicity
result is deferred to a full-length version.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
p(y|x)
A B
F
S1
S0
K
ŜK
Xn Y n
Fig. 1. String Oblivious Transfer
Consider the setup in Fig. 1. Alice’s data are two strings
S0, S1 chosen independently and uniformly from {0, 1}m.
Bob’s data is a uniform bit K ∈ {0, 1} independent of
S0, S1. The goal is for Bob to learn SK . We require that
neither user learn any (significant) amount of additional
information about the other’s data apart from Bob learning
2In fact, it is easy to show that secure computation of OT is equivalent
to secure sampling of the distribution: A = (W0,W1) by Alice and
B = (J,WJ ) by Bob, where W0,W1 ∈ {0, 1}m and J ∈ {0, 1}
indepedent and uniform. Hence, the results in [15] can be used to derive
bounds on OT capacity of discrete memoryless sources. Using a lemma
of this paper, we give explicit bounds in Section V.
SK . They have access to unlimited amounts of private
randomness (i.e., randomness independent of each other
and of the data) and a noiseless discussion channel. There
is also a DMC from Alice to Bob: p(y|x) where x ∈ X ,
the input alphabet, and y ∈ Y , the output alphabet. Before
each instance of using the DMC and after the last use
of the DMC, Alice and Bob may exchange messages
with each other over the noiseless discussion channel,
potentially over multiple rounds. There are no constraints
on the number of rounds of message exchange they may
engage in over the discussion channel except that it be
finite with probability 1. We assume that the users are
honest-but-curious.
Definition 1. Alice and Bob are said to have followed an
(n,m, ) secure protocol if, the strings S0 and S1 input to
Alice have lengthm each (as above), the protocol makes n
uses of the DMC, and at the end of the protocol, Bob can
output ŜK which agrees with SK with probability at least
1− , and if the transcript F of the messages exchanged
on the discussion channel and the inputs Xn and outputs
Y n of the DMC satisfy the following privacy constraints3:
I(F,Xn;K|S0, S1) ≤ , (1)
I(F, Y n;SK¯ |K) ≤ n. (2)
Notice that (1) guarantees Bob’s privacy against Alice,
and (2) guarantees privacy for Alice against Bob.
Definition 2. A rate R is said to be achievable if there
is a sequence of (n, nR, n) secure protocols such that
n → 0 as n→∞. The supremum of all achievable rates
is the OT capacity, C, of the DMC.
Our main result is the following upper bound on OT
capacity.
Theorem 1.
C ≤ max
p(x)
min
Q−X−Y
I(X;Q|Y ) + I(X;Y |Q), (3)
where the the minimization is over random variables Q
jointly distributed with X,Y satisfying the Markov chain
constraint Q − X − Y and the cardinality bound |Q| ≤
|X ||Y|+ 2.
The currently best known upper bound is due to
Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1]:
C ≤ max
p(x)
min(I(X;Y ), H(X|Y )). (4)
It is easy to see that Theorem 1 subsumes this. For a
fixed p(x) in (3), notice that choosing Q = ∅ gives the
bound I(X;Y ), and choosing Q = X gives the bound
H(X|Y ). We shall show in Section IV that our bound is
a strict improvement on (4).
3Notice that we do not need to explicitly bring in the private
random variables in defining the privacy conditions since, conditioned
F,Xn, S0, S1, Alice’s private randomness is independent of K and,
similarly, conditioned on F, Y n,K, Bob’s private randomness is inde-
pendent of S0, S1.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Conisder an (n, nR, ) secure protocol, let all the ran-
dom variables that Alice has access to after the i-th usage
of the DMC be called the view of Alice at the i-th stage
and be represented by Ui, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n, where U0
denotes Alice’s view at the beginning of the protocol, i.e.,
U0 is made up of S0, S1, and the private randomness of
Alice. Similarly, we define the view of Bob till the i-th
stage and denote it by Vi. Let Ufinal and Vfinal be the views
of Alice and Bob at the termination of the protocol (after
Bob outputs). Ufinal consists of S0, S1, the transcript F of
the discussion over the noisefree channel, the inputs Xn to
the DMC and Alice’s private randomness. Similarly, Vfinal
comprises K,F, Y n, ŜK , and Bob’s private randomness.
For a pair of jointly distributed random variables U, V ,
let us define the function α(U ;V )
α(U ;V ) := min
Q−U−V
I(U ;Q|V ) + I(U ;V |Q). (5)
This is closely related to the tension region T(U ;V ) of
a pair of random variables U, V of [15]. We recall from
there the definition of T(U ;V ):
T(U ;V ) = i
({(
I(V ;Q|U), I(U ;Q|V ), I(U ;V |Q)) :
Q jointly distributed with U, V
})
,
where i(S) denotes the increasing hull of S ⊆ R3+, defined
as i(S) = {s ∈ R3+ : ∃s′ ∈ S s.t. s ≥ s′}. Thus, we have
α(U ;V ) = min{s2 + s3 : (0, s2, s3) ∈ T(U ;V )}.
From [15, Theorems 2.3 and 2.4], we know that T(U ;V )
is a closed, convex region and that, without loss of general-
ity, we may assume the cardinality bound |Q| ≤ |X ||Y|+2
on the alphabet of Q in the definition. This justifies the
use of min and the cardinality bound in (3) as well as the
use of min in (5).
As we will prove later, α as a function of the two views
satisfies the following properties:
(a) α(Ui;Vi) ≤ α(Ui−1;Vi−1)+α(Xi;Yi), i = 1, . . . , n.
This means that α of the views can increase at most
by α(Xi;Yi) between the (i− 1)-th and the i-th uses
of the DMC. Specifically, we will see that no increase
in α can come from the discussion over the noiseless
channel, and an increase of at most α(Xi;Yi) accrues
from the i-th use of the DMC. This allows us to upper
bound the increase in α of the views as the protocol
progresses.
(b) α(U0;V0) = α(S0S1;K) = 0,
α(Ufinal;Vfinal) = α(Un;Vn).
This means that α of the initial views is 0, and the α
of the final views is the same as after the final use of
the DMC.
(c) α(S0S1;KSK) ≤ α(Ufinal;Vfinal) + nδ(),
where δ() → 0 as  → 0. This means that α of
the final views must be at least close to the α of the
inputs and (ideal) outputs of Alice and Bob for the
OT function being securely computed.
(d) α(S0S1;KSK) = nR
This means that α when applied to the inputs and
(ideal) outputs of Alice and Bob gives the length of
the input strings to Alice.
(e) α(X;Y ) is a concave function of p(x) for a fixed
p(y|x). This justifies the use of max instead of sup
in (3).
Now applying (a) recursively and using (b), we get
α(Ufinal;Vfinal) ≤
n∑
i=1
α(Xi;Yi).
Using (c) and (d), we get
nR = α(S0S1;KSK) ≤ α(Ufinal;Vfinal) + nδ().
Thus, we have
R ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
α(Xi;Yi) + δ() ≤ max
p(x)
α(X;Y ) + δ().
Thus, we may conclude that max
p(x)
α(X;Y ) is an upper
bound on the OT-capacity for the DMC p(y|x).
It only remains to prove (a)-(e).
(a) Let U˜i and V˜i be the views of Alice and Bob
right before the i-th use of the DMC. Then, U˜i =
(Ui−1,∆Fi−1, Xi) and V˜i = (Vi−1,∆Fi−1), where
∆Fi−1 is the transcript of the messages exchanged over
the noiseless discussion channel after the i − 1-th use of
the DMC and before the i-th use. Note that Ui = U˜i and
Vi = (V˜i, Yi). The following can be inferred from [15,
Theorem 5.4]:
T(U˜i; V˜i) ⊇ T(Ui−1;Vi−1),
i.e., the tension region of views cannot shrink during the
discussion phase, or by Alice doing a private computation
of Xi. Hence,
α(U˜i; V˜i) ≤ α(Ui−1, Vi−1).
In fact, the second line of property (b) also follows
similarly, i.e., α(Ufinal;Vfinal) = α(Un;Vn). Property (a)
now follows from the following lemma which is proved
in the appendix.
Lemma 1.
α(Ui;Vi) ≤ α(U˜i; V˜i) + α(Xi;Yi).
(b) By choosing Q to be a constant, α(U0;V0) =
α(S0, S1;K) = 0 follows. Proof of α(Ufinal;Vfinal) =
α(Un;Vn) was already mentioned in (a).
(c) For a pair of random variables U, V , and 0 ≤  ≤
H(V |U), we define
α(U ;V ) = min
I(Q;V |U)≤
I(U ;Q|V ) + I(U ;V |Q).
Note that α(U ;V ) = α0(U ;V ). We will need the follow-
ing property (proved in the appendix using the fact that
T(U ;V ) is closed [15, Theorem 2.4]).
Lemma 2. For any pair of random variables U, V , the
function α(U ;V ) is right continuous in  at 0.
Property (c) now follows from the following lemma
(also proved in the appendix):
Lemma 3.
α(S0S1;KSk) ≤ α(S0S1FXn;KSKFY n) + nδ1(),
α(S0S1FX
n;KSKFY
n) ≤ α(Ufinal;Vfinal) + nδ2(),
where δ1()→ 0 and δ2()→ 0 as → 0.
The proof of the first part relies on the privacy condi-
tions (1)-(2). The second part uses P (ŜK 6= SK) ≤ .
(d) We prove the following lemma in the appendix.
Lemma 4. I(S0S1;KSK |Q) + I(S0S1;Q|KSK) ≥ nR
for all Q− S0S1 −KSK .
The property follows by noticing that equality is
achieved by Q = ∅.
(e) For Q−X − Y ,
I(X;Q|Y ) + I(X;Y |Q)
= I(XY : Q)− I(Y ;Q) + I(X;Y |Q)
= I(X;Q)− I(Y ;Q) + I(X;Y |Q)
= H(Q|Y )−H(Q|X) +H(Y |Q)−H(Y |X).
For fixed p(q|x) and p(y|x), the above expression is
concave in p(x) since H(Q|X), H(Y |X) are linear in
p(x), and both H(Q|Y ), H(Y |Q) are concave in p(x);
the latter can be shown, for instance, using the convexity
of relative entropy. i.e., for the DMC p(y|x), if we define
fp(q|x)(p(x)) := I(X;Q|Y ) + I(X;Y |Q),
where the mutual information terms are evaluated using
p(x, y, q) = p(x)p(q|x)p(y|x), then, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
λfp(q|x)(p1(x)) + (1− λ)fp(q|x)(p2(x))
≤ fp(q|x)(λp1(x) + (1− λ)p2(x)).
Property (e) now follows from noticing that α(X;Y ) =
min
p(q|x)
fp(q|x)(p(x)).
IV. AN EXAMPLE
1− t
t
1
1
0
1
0
X Y
Fig. 2. The Z-channel (or binary asymmetric channel)
Consider the Z-channel p(y|x) shown in Figure 2.
p(0|0) = 1 − p(1|0) = 1, and p(0|1) = 1 − p(1|1) = t,
where 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Figure 3 compares the upper bound (3)
on OT capacity from Theorem 1 with the upper bound (4)
of Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1]. In fact, for ease of numerical
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t
Upper bound of Ahlswede and Csiszár
Upper bound of Theorem 1
A simple lower bound
Fig. 3. Bounds on OT capacity of the Z-channel
calculation, what is plotted is (3) optimized over a smaller
set of choices for Q; specifically, we restrict to binary
Q and p(q|x) of the form p(0|1) = 0. Even with this
restriction, we observe that for a range of t’s the upper
bound of (3) strictly improves upon (4).
For comparison, we also plot a simple lower bound
to the OT capacity of this channel. Let us consider two
channel uses at a time. Now if we only use the input
letters from {01, 10}, then this is a binary erasure channel
(erasure symbol 00) with erasure probability t for which
the OT capacity was shown in [1] to be min(1 − t, t).
So a lower bound for the OT capacity of the Z-channel is
min(1−t,t)
2 . We leave the problem of characterizing the OT
capacity of the Z-channel as an interesting open problem.
We conjecture that at least the lower bound, if not both
the bounds, can be improved.
V. DISCUSSION
An analogous upper bound on the OT capacity of the
source model can be derived using the results in [15].
Applying Lemma 4 of this paper to [15, Corollary 5.8],
the OT capacity C of the discrete memoryless source pX,Y
can be shown to satisfy
C ≤ min
Q−X−Y
I(X;Q|Y ) + I(X;Y |Q).
Details are deferred to a full-length version of this paper..
While this paper focused on deriving an upper bound
on OT capacity of DMCs, the technique is more general.
In fact, we can derive a general upper bound on the secure
sampling capacity of DMCs analogous to the upper bound
in [15, Section V] for the source model. The upper bound
on OT capacity presented here will follow as a corollary
of such a general upper bound. This is deferred to a full-
length version.
The definition of OT capacity of DMCs in [12], [7],
[1], [13] is in terms of the length of the string (m) per
channel use. A different (not equivalent) possibility is
to fix m (say m = 1, for 1-bit OT) and consider the
number of independent m-string OTs obtained per channel
use. This is of interest since, in many secure computation
protocols, several independent instances of OT are called
for (unlike the one instance of a long string-OT considered
in the original definition of OT capacity). We may also
consider varying the number of strings given to Alice and
the number of strings picked up Bob. The general upper
bound mentioned above provides means to derive upper
bounds on the rates in all these cases.
The achievability question of how to obtain “high” rates
of secure computation/sampling, in general, remains open.
The capacity achieving schemes for generalized erasure
channels of [1], [13] do not appear to extend to the
general case. For the alternative definitions of capacity
mentioned above, the best achievability results available
for the general case only achieve very low (but non-zero)
rates [8]. This is an important problem which requires
further research.
Unlike in the two-party setting, information theoreti-
cally secure computation, in general, becomes feasible in
the multiuser case even when only private randomness at
users and private noise-free channels between every pair
of users are available, provided the fraction of colluding
adversarial users is constrained (less than 1/2 for honest-
but-curious and less than 1/3 for malicious) [2], [3]. When
such constraints are not satisfied, availability of pairwise
OTs, for instance, can enable secure computation in gen-
eral [6], [14]. Hence, OT capacity of multiuser channels
is also of interest [11]. Secure computation in multiuser
(noisy) networks is another question which merits further
study.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that Ui = U˜i which contains Xi
as part of it, and Vi = (V˜i, Yi). Suppose we have Q˜ jointly
distributed with U˜i, V˜i such that Q˜− U˜i− V˜i is a Markov
chain, and Q′ is jointly distributed with Xi, Yi such that
Q′−Xi−Yi a Markov chain. We define a random variable
Q with alphabet Q = Q˜ × Q′, where Q˜ and Q′ are the
alphabets of Q˜ and Q′ respectively, jointly distributed with
Ui, Vi as follows:
pQ|Ui,Vi((q˜, q
′)|ui, vi) = pQ˜|U˜i(q˜|u˜i)pQ′|Xi(q′|xi),
where the u˜i on the right hand side is the same as ui, and
xi is the xi which is part of ui. Notice that Q− Ui − Vi
is a Markov chain.
To prove the lemma, it is enough to show the following
two inequalities
I(Ui;Q|Vi) ≤ I(U˜i; Q˜|V˜i) + I(Xi;Q′|Yi), (6)
I(Ui;Vi|Q) ≤ I(U˜i; V˜i|Q˜) + I(Xi;Yi|Q′). (7)
With come abuse of notation, if we write Q = (Q˜,Q′),
then
pUi,V˜i,Xi,Yi,Q(u, v˜, x, y, (q˜, q
′))
= pU˜i,V˜i(u, v˜)pQ˜|U˜i(q˜|u)pXi|U˜i(x|u)pY |X(y|x)pQ′|Xi(q′|x),
(8)
where pY |X is the DMC and pXi|U˜i is deterministic. We
have
I(Ui;Q|Vi) = I(Ui; Q˜Q′|V˜iYi)
= I(Ui; Q˜|V˜iYi) + I(Ui;Q′|Q˜V˜iYi)
≤ I(UiYi; Q˜|V˜i) + I(UiQ˜V˜i;Q′|Yi)
= [I(Ui; Q˜|V˜i) + I(Yi; Q˜|Ui, V˜i)]
+ [I(Xi;Q
′|Yi) + I(UiQ˜V˜i;Q′|XiYi)]
= I(U˜i; Q˜|V˜i) + I(Xi;Q′|Yi),
where, in the penultimate step, we used the fact that Xi is
a part of Ui, and in the last step, we used Ui = U˜i and the
fact that, for the joint distribution in (8), Q˜− (Ui, V˜i)−Yi
and Q′ − (Xi, Yi)− (Ui, Q˜, V˜i) are Markov chains.
Similarly,
I(Ui;Vi|Q) = I(Ui; V˜iYi|Q˜Q′)
= I(Ui; V˜i|Q˜Q′) + I(Ui;Yi|V˜iQ˜Q′)
≤ I(UiQ′; V˜i|Q˜) + I(UiV˜iQ˜;Yi|Q′)
= [I(Ui; V˜i|Q˜) + I(Q′; V˜i|UiQ˜)]
+ [I(Xi;Yi|Q′) + I(UiV˜iQ˜;Yi|Q′Xi)]
= I(U˜i; V˜i|Q˜) + I(Xi;Yi|Q′),
where the last step follows from the fact that, for the joint
distribution in (8), Q′− (Ui, Q˜)− V˜i and (Q′, Yi)−Xi−
(Ui, V˜i, Q˜) are Markov chains.
Proof of Lemma 2. We fix the joint distribution U, V .
Below, we will write α to mean α(U ;V ). Note that
α is a non-increasing function of . Suppose α is
not (right) continuous at  = 0, Then there exists a
sequence n → 0 such that αn 6→ α0. So there exists
a δ > 0 and a monotone subsequence ′n ↓ 0 such that
α0−α′n ≥ δ, ∀n. Since α′n is a monotone non-decreasing
sequence bounded above it is convergent. Let l = sup
n
α′n .
Then, l = lim
n→∞α
′
n
≤ α0 − δ. Since T(U ;V ) is a closed
region [15, Theorem 2.4], so is
T1,2+3(U ;V ) := {(s1, s2 + s3) : (s1, s2, s3) ∈ T(U ;V )}.
Hence, all the limit points of T1,2+3(U ;V ) lie in itself.
So (0, l) ∈ T1,2+3(U ;V ). This leads to a contradiction as
l ≤ α0−δ and, by definition, α0 is the minimum attainable
value of s such (0, s) ∈ T1,2+3(U ;V ).
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof of the first part is along
the lines of the proof of property 3′ of [15, The-
orem 5.7]. Consider any Q jointly distributed with
S0, S1,K, F,X
n, Y n. We have
I(KSKY
nF ;Q|S0S1FXn)
= I(KY nF ;Q|S0S1FXn)
≥ I(K;Q|S0S1FXn)
= I(K;QFXn|S0S1)− I(K;FY n|S0S1)
≥ I(K;Q|S0S1)− I(K;FY n|S0S1)
≥ I(K;Q|S0S1)−  (by (1))
= I(KSK ;Q|S0S1)− . (9)
I(S0S1X
nF ;KSKY
nF |Q) ≥ I(S0S1;KSK |Q). (10)
I(S0S1X
nF ;KSKY
nF ;Q|KSKY nF )
= I(S0S1X
n;Q|KSKY nF )
≥ I(S0S1;Q|KSKY nF )
= I(S0S1;QY
nF |KSK)− I(S0S1;Y nF |KSK)
≥ I(S0S1;Q|KSK)− I(S0S1;Y nF |KSK). (11)
But,
I(S0S1;Y
nF |KSK)
= I(SK¯ ;Y
nF |KSK)
= I(SK¯ ;YnF |K) (by indep. of S0, S1,K)
≤ n. (by (2)) (12)
Substituting (12) in (11),
I(S0S1X
nF ;KSKY
nF ;Q|KSKY nF )
≥ I(S0S1;Q|KSK)− n. (13)
The first part of the lemma follows from (9),(10), and (13).
Specifically,
α(S0S1;KSK) ≤ α(S0S1XnF ;KSKY nF ) + n.
To show the second part, let us first observe that Ufinal
contains S0S1FXn and Vfinal contains KŜKFY n. Further
more,
Ufinal − S0S1FXn −KŜKFY n − Vfinal
is a Markov chain, i.e., conditioned on S0, S1, F,Xn,
Alice’s final view (which only additionally contains her
private randomness) is conditionally independent of Bob’s
final view, and similarly, Bob’s view is conditionally
independent of Alice’s view conditioned on K, ŜK , F, Y n.
Hence, by property 3 of [15, Theorem 5.4], we have
T(S0S1FX
n;KŜKFY
n) ⊇ T(Ufinal;Vfinal).
This implies that
α(S0S1FX
n;KŜKFY
n) ≤ α(Ufinal;Vfinal).
It remains to show that
α(S0S1FX
n;KSKFY
n)
≤ α(S0S1FXn;KŜKFY n) + nδ2().
Let U := (S0, S1, F,Xn), Vˆ := (K, ŜK , F, Y n), and
V := (K,SK , F, Y
n). Since F is part of both U and Vˆ ,
we have
α(U ; Vˆ ) = min
Q−U−Vˆ
I(U ;Q|Vˆ ) + I(U ; Vˆ |Q)
= min
Q′−U−Vˆ
I(U ;Q′F |Vˆ ) + I(U ; Vˆ |Q′F )
Let U ′ := (S0, S1, Xn), Vˆ ′ := (K, ŜK , Y n), and V ′ :=
(K,SK , Y
n). Then,
α(U ; Vˆ ) = min
Q′−(U ′F )−(Vˆ ′F )
I(U ′;Q′|Vˆ ′F ) + I(U ′; Vˆ ′|Q′F ).
Similarly,
α(U ;V )
= min
Q˜′−(U ′F )−(V ′F )
I(U ′; Q˜′|V ′F ) + I(U ′;V ′|Q˜′F ).
For Q′ jointly distributed with (U ′, F, Vˆ ′) such that Q′−
(U ′, F ) − (Vˆ ′, F ) is a Markov chain, we will define Q˜′
with the same alphabet as Q′ and jointly distributed with
(U ′, F, V ′) such that Q′− (U ′, F )− (V ′, F ) is a Markov
chain by defining
pQ˜′|U ′,F (q
′|u′, f) := pQ′|U ′,F (q′|u′, f).
Then, since P (Vˆ 6= V ) ≤ , the total variation distance
between (Q′, U ′, F, Vˆ ′) and (Q˜′, U ′, F, V ′) is at most
, where total variation distance between two random
variables W and W ′ defined over the same alphabet W
is defined as ∆(W,W ′) = 12
∑
w∈W |pW (w)− pW ′(w)|.
We will make use [15, Lemma 2.6] to obtain
I(U ′; Q˜′|V ′F ) ≤ I(U ′;Q′|Vˆ ′F )
+ 2H2() + n(2R+ log |X |)
I(U ′;V ′|Q˜′F ) ≤ I(U ′; Vˆ ′|Q′F )
+ 2H2() + n(2R+ log |X |),
where H2 is the binary entropy function, and the term
n(2R + log |X |) is, in fact, the cardinality of U ′. From
this we may conclude that
α(S0S1FX
n;KSKFY
n)
≤ α(S0S1FXn;KŜKFY n) + nδ2(),
where δ2()→ 0 as → 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4. We have,
I(S0S1;Q|KSK)
= I(S0S1;QKSK)− I(S0S1;KSK)
= I(S0S1;KSK |Q) + I(S0S1;Q)− I(S0S1;KSK).
Using this, we can write
I(S0S1;KSK |Q) + I(S0S1;Q|KSK)
= 2I(S0S1;KSK |Q) + [I(S0S1;Q)− I(S0S1;KSK)]
= 2[H(KSK |Q)−H(KSK |S0S1)]
+ [H(S0S1|KSK)−H(S0S1|Q)], (14)
where in the last step we used the fact that Q − S0S1 −
KSK is a Markov chain. As we will argue below, under
this Markov chain,
2H(KSK |Q)−H(S0S1|Q) ≥ 2.
Using this, along with H(KSK |S0S1) = 1 and
H(S0S1|KSK) = nR in (14), we can conclude that
I(S0S1;KSK |Q) + I(S0S1;Q|KSK) ≥ nR.
It only remains to show that 2H(KSK |Q) −
H(S0S1|Q) ≥ 2 if Q− S0S1 −KSK is a Markov chain.
Since K is independent of (S0, S1), it is also independent
of (Q,S0, S1). Hence, using the fact that K is a uniform
bit,
2H(KSK |Q) = 2H(K) + 2H(SK |QK)
= 2 +H(S0|Q,K = 0) +H(S1|Q,K = 1)
= 2 +H(S0|Q) +H(S1|Q)
≥ 2 +H(S0S1|Q).
This completes the proof.
